ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL

Microelectronic Product Division

In February 1975, top executives of the Microelectronic Product Division of Rockwell International were reviewing Rockwell's recent entry into the consumer calculator market. While pleased with Rockwell's early results, they were not certain that a continuation of Rockwell's introductory marketing strategy would be the best course to follow. In particular, Rockwell's introductory program had been designed to obtain maximum support from leading department stores and calculator specialty stores. Rockwell executives felt this strategy had been quite effective, but there were signs that the market might now be shifting from department stores and specialty stores to mass merchandising channels of distribution as industry price levels continued to drop. According to trade rumors, the industry leader, Texas Instruments (TI), was planning to broaden its distribution to include mass merchandisers in mid-1975. Rockwell executives had to decide whether to continue their planned roll-out through emphasis on department stores and calculator shops or to anticipate TI's move into mass distribution.

Company Background

Rockwell International was a large, diversified firm with fiscal 1974 sales of \$4.4 billion and profits after tax of \$130.3 million. It was divided into five major operations -- Automotive, Aerospace, Electronics, Utility and Industrial, and Consumer. In recent years, the company had been decreasing the portion of its business represented by government defense and aerospace contracts. While government contracts had represented 74% of its business in 1967, this figure had dropped to 36% by 1974.

Rockwell's Microelectronic Product Division was one of three parts of the Electronics Operations whose fiscal 1974 sales had approximated \$900 million. Microelectronic was a manufacturer of sophisticated semiconductor devices, business machines, and consumer calculators. It was one of the world's largest manufacturers of LSI (large-scale integrated) circuits,

This case was written by Nancy J. Davis, Research Associate, as a basis for class discussion and not to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

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displays, and keyboards, the major components in electronic calculators. In an industry in which rapidly declining component costs and learning curve pricing had established the competitive climate, and nonintegrated or small volume manufacturers appeared to be at a serious competitive disadvantage, industry sources estimated that Rockwell's manufacturing costs were as low as those of any other firm in the industry.

Prior to the fall of 1974, Rockwell had not marketed a calculator under its own name. It had, however, been a principle supplier of components for thirty-six brands of calculators and had produced over a million of the private label calculators sold by such firms as Sears Roebuck and Company, Unicom, and Lloyds Electronics. Up to mid-k974, the Microelectronic Group produced more than 65 models of private label calculators. According to industry estimates, Rockwell had been the third largest manufacturer of calculators (after TI and Bowmar Instruments Corporation) in both 1973 and 1974.

In early 1974, Rockwell management decided to enter the branded calculator business with a line of Rockwell calculators, while maintaining its large private label and components businesses. At that time, it was becoming increasingly clear that the cost advantages and aggressive pricing of such integrated firms as TI and National Semiconductor were about to cause an industry shakeout which would most seriously affect those firms which relied on components purchased from larger electronics companies such as Rockwell.

The U.S. Calculator Industry

The development of integrated circuits (IC's) in the early sixties made possible the creation of the first electronic calculators. Sumlock Comptometer Co., Ltd., an English firm acquired by Rockwell in 1973, developed the first electronic calculator in 1961 as a replacement for electromechanical machines. Its high cost prevented widespread use, however. In the mid to late 1960's, a number of American business equipment manufacturers, using more advanced integrated circuits, brought machines in the \$1,000+ range on the market. In 1969-1970, using American IC's manufactured by TI and Rockwell, the Japanese surprised U.S. business machine manufacturers with a wide range of calculators costing as low as \$395 for a 4 function (+, -, +, X) unit. By 1971 Japanese manufacturers had captured more than 60% of the small but rapidly expanding calculator market.

In the early seventies, a second technological breakthrough, the development of low cost integrated microcircuits, allowed for the production of small hand-held calculators and enabled U.S. manufacturers to compete with Japanese manufacturers. Most of these small calculators had four or five functions (addition, substraction, multiplication, division, and percentage), a floating decimal point, and an eight-digit display. The least expensive models had only four functions, a six-digit display, and a fixed decimal point. More expensive models contained a memory, while models for business and scientific purposes often contained a memory plus up to fifteen engineering and mathematical functions and had twelve-digit displays.

In 1971, Bowmar introduced a four-function pocket calculator which retailed for \$240. By late summer, Rapid Data Systems and Equipment, Ltd., TI, and Commodore Business Machines, Inc. introduced competing machines.

Many other firms soon entered the business, but Bowmar held its dominant market position through 1972. In mid-1972, Rapid Data introduced a calculator which retailed for under \$100, and this began an industry-wide downward trend in pricing. TI soon came out with its TI-2500 at \$149 retail, \$30 less than a competitive Bowmar model. Bowmar quickly matched TI's price, where-upon TI dropped its price another \$30. By late 1974, the TI-2500 was retailing for \$44.95. Such price erosion was prevalent throughout the industry.

As prices plummeted, unit sales skyrocketed. Total industry unit sales went from half a million in 1971 to about twelve million in 1974. Industry estimates as to when the market would reach saturation were mixed. One source stated that saturation level would be 1 to 1.3 calculators per household, and that there were about sixty million households in the U.S. He estimated the average life span of a calculator to be about three years, and he said the replacement rate for calculators would eventually level off at twenty to twenty-five million annually. The transistor radio industry, with which the calculator industry was frequently compared, had leveled off at about thirty-five million units annually. (See Exhibit 1 for historical and projected unit and dollar sales.)

The cost of producing calculators had also shown remarkable reductions. Semiconductor components for the early calculators which retailed for about \$400 had cost about \$170. In 1974 these components had been replaced by an LSI chip which cost under \$5, and it was thought that an integrated manufacturer with a volume output could save another dollar on these chips. Assembly time for calculators now ranted from a few minutes to half an hour. In fact, labor and manufacturing overhead had been driven down so far that the chip, the display, and the keyboard now normally represented seventy to eighty percent of a unit's cost.

By the end of 1974, an estimated twenty-five to thirty U.S. and Japanese calculator manufacturers had dropped out of the business, and less than a dozen were expected to survive through 1975. In addition to Rockwell, Packard (HP), National Semiconductor, Commodore, Casio, and Litronix.

TI was the largest semiconductor and calculator manufacturer in the world. It also produced low-cost keyboards and LED displays, and it supplied chips to more than twenty other calculator manufacturers. It had one of the broadest product lines in the industry. In 1974, TI held almost thirty percent of the U.S. unit market and about 19% of the world unit market and had dollar sales of nearly \$250 million worldwide. TI's strategy consisted of four elements: aggressive pricing to follow learning curve reductions in cost (25% to 35% for each doubling of accumulated production); continuing efforts to improve products and reduce costs; building on shared experience; and keeping capacity growing ahead of demand. TI concentrated on high-growth markets which would allow both rapid increases in cumulative volume and increases in market share which did not seriously affect competitors' growth. Its 25 person sales force called on 250 to 400 accounts whose retail outlets totaled approximately 5,000.

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Bowmar produced its own displays and in 1974 it began producing its own keyboards. Its ICs were purchased from either TI, Rockwell, or MOS Technology. Lack of IC capacity prevented Bowmar from responding rapidly to changes in technology and design and thus limited its growth. Bowmar had made a \$7 million investment in an IC production plant, but for the year ending September 30, 1974, it had shown a \$13 million after tax loss on sales of \$83 million, and there was some speculation that it might soon be forced into bankruptcy. Bowmar relied on manufacturers representatives (reps) to sell its products.

HP was a major manufacturer of electronic instrumentation, computers, calculators, components, and medical electronics. In the calculator industry, it had concentrated on the more complex, more expensive units for scientific and business use, though by the end of 1974 it had begun to market some medium-priced models. It was expected that competition from TI, Rockwell, and Bowmar would force HP to lower its prices, but that they would still be \$30 to \$50 above competing models because of the products recognized excellence and advanced design. HP calculators were sold by reps to major department stores and to over 250 college bookstores.

National Semiconductor's consumer products group, Novus Electronics, concentrated on lower-priced models which were often used as promotional items, and on private labeling for mass merchandisers such as Montgomery Ward and W.T. Grant. It also marketed calculators through drug and grocery outlets. Its products were sold by reps. National was a sound, fully integrated, and highly competitive semiconductor manufacturer. It had low overhead, strict cost accountability, and a strong international base in both sales and marketing. It was expected to continue to hold a large unit share of the market, but not a large dollar share unless it started producing more sophisticated, more costly calculators.

Commodore had been very aggressive in the world market, but was not doing very well in the U.S. market. Some industry sources felt that Commodore had to offer a more reliable product and faster repair turnaround to attain a better position in the U.S.

Other companies which were considered strong contenders in the U.S. calculator industry were Litronix, whose lower-priced calculators (\$19.99 and \$29.99) were said to be especially good values, and Casio, a company which imported most of its calculators from Japan. Casio's calculators were considered especially reliable, with a defect rate as low as one half of one percent. Its \$19.99 hand model and \$99.95 printing calculator were especially successful

Manufacturers representatives ("reps") were independent businesspeople who served as the sales force for several complimentary but noncompeting products. Reps who sold calculators were usually known as consumer electronics reps. Their product lines often included radios, television sets, cameras, stereo equipment, and so forth. These reps usually sold directly to retailers, though some sold to distributors who in turn sold to retailers. Reps were paid a commission consisting of a specified percentage of sales.* In the case of calculators, their commission was usually about 5%.

products. Many considered its \$129.95 C-100P to be the best printing calculator on the market. Another company which was strong in the low end of the market was Unisonic. As calculator prices dropped, Japanese manufacturers began to make a comeback. They were expected to sell three times as many calculators in 1975 as they had sold in 1974 and to capture as much as 35 to 40 percent of the market as measured in units. (See Exhibit 2 for 1974 U.S. unit sales and market share data by manufacturer, Exhibit 3 for calculator lines produced by major manufacturers, and Exhibit 4 for 1974 U.S. sales by product categories.)

Patterns of Distribution

In the early days of the calculator industry, the bulk and price of calculators resulted in their being used primarily in offices. Therefore, they were mainly sold through business equipment stores. In the early seventies, when scientists, engineers, architects, and business people began to get interested in calculators, manufacturers started selling them through department stores and direct mail and to credit card companies who resold them via advertisements in monthly statements. By 1973, mass merchandisers were becoming popular outlets, and they were expected to become even more important as the market matured.

The trend toward distribution of calculators through mass merchandise outlets caused problems for both manufacturers and mass merchandisers. Though mass merchandisers welcomed the high volume and profits offered by calculators, the products' price instability, the need for secure means to prevent counter-top theft, and lack of trained salespeople caused them problems. Department stores usually were not hurt so badly by a manufacturer's price cut because they usually purchased relatively small quantities per order which they could promote heavily and sell fairly quickly and because manufacturers offered them some degree of price protection. However, mass merchandisers usually ordered basic inventory for the first five months and the last seven months of the year, and they could not react as quickly as could department stores to price decreases nor could manufacturers offer as good price protection on the larger inventories. Thus, mass merchandisers needed to know well in advance what the manufacturer planned to do with regard to pricing.

The third problem mass merchandisers faced was finding personnel qualified to demonstrate the calculators or finding ways to get around demonstrating them. As had been the case earlier with cameras, consumers usually needed more explanation about calculators than about most of the products mass merchandisers sold. Many mass merchandisers did not have adequate personnel to handle this task, and those who did usually did not have time to train them, especially since calculator models changed so rapidly. Some manufacturers provided instructional services for the stores, but they had problems with rapid personnel turnover. "Training new people become a full time job with an item as technical as the calculator," one manufacturer commented. "We've started sending instructions on cassettes to salespeople so that they can listen to explanations of the products while keeping one hand on the calculator."

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Traditionally, different manufacturers had concentrated on different distribution channels. Bowmar had focused primarily on office machine outlets, direct mail, and mass merchandisers, while HP's and TI's primary outlets had been major department stores and college bookstores. In 1973 TI had tried unsuccessfully to enter the mass merchandiser market with its Exactra model which retailed for \$20 to \$30. The fact that Exactra was a TI line was not emphasized in its advertising. Novus sold its products primarily through mass merchandiser, drug, and grocery outlets. Unisonic, the major supplier to K-Mart, concentrated on mass merchandisers. (See Exhibit 5 for 1974 U.S. unit sales by distribution channel.)

The Rockwell Entry

Rockwell executives decided in early 1974 to begin manufacturing calculators under the Rockwell brand. To handle the marketing of the calculators, they hired Mr. James Donaldson from a major consumer products company to be Vice President of Marketing for the Microelectronic Product Division. Mr. Donaldson joined Rockwell in April 1974. Rockwell's aim was to gain at least 12% penetration of the market within a year after entry.

Rockwell's initial marketing plan focused on department stores and calculator shops in twenty key markets. This plan would place Rockwell products in 548 outlets. Once this target was met, Rockwell would begin opening similar accounts in twenty secondary markets. This would add another 188 outlets. Rockwell management thought the prestige of department stores such as Bloomingdale's and Neiman Marcus would help establish the company's reputation and that stores such as Macy's, Bamburger's, and Gimbels were essential to generate large sales volume. They also hoped to get supplemental distribution through premium accounts, hardware stores, and internal business within the company. (See Exhibit 6 for primary and secondary markets and the number of target accounts in each.)

Rockwell executives felt strongly that, to compete in a market in which competition was so firmly entrenched, their support of the trade would have to be exceptionally strong. They decided to market a family of six calculators whose distinctive color styling and graphics would develop a strong brand identification so that Rockwell products could be easily recognized and each would help sell the others. Furthermore, they felt that having a complete line of calculators would allow for replacement and trade-up purchases among Rockwell consumers. The first line consisted of the following:

	Product	Manufacturers suggested retail price
10R.	8-digit electronic calculator	\$29.95
20R.	electronic calculator with memory	**************************************
77777	and percent	49.95
30R,	slide rule memory electronic calculator	
*51R,	universal converter electronic	1000000
	calculator	109.95
*61R.	advanced slide rule electronic	
	calculator	119.95
*80R.	10-digit printer electronic	
	calculator	169.95

^{*}Rechargeable

(See Exhibit 7 for descriptions and manufacturers selling price of each model.)

Rockwell sold its calculators through a direct sales force consisting of Mr. Adam Thomas, national sales manager, five regional sales managers, and 17 district sales managers. This group met for the first time August 4-8, 1974. It began its sales efforts in Rockwell's 20 target markets during the week of August 12. Salespeople were assigned a product mix objective, and they were in turn responsible for the even distribution of products by models for each of their target accounts.

To decrease the problems which defective or unsatisfactory calculators might cause retailers, Rockwell instituted a consumer satisfaction policy. Under this policy, if a consumer returned his Rockwell calculator within thirty days of purchase for refund or exchange, the retailer was authorized to accept the calculator and return it to the nearest Rockwell Customer Service Center. He would then be issued a credit for that product at the quantity price of his last order consistent with the current price sheet. (Other manufacturers usually issued the same or similar products for returned merchandise.) Moreover, each calculator carried a one year warranty under which Rockwell repaired or replaced free of charge any parts which became defective through normal use. If the defect became evident thirty days after the purchase, the owner sent the calculator to one of Rockwell's Consumer Service Centers in New York, Chicago, Dallas, and Los Angeles, not to the retail outlet where he purchased it. Rockwell's goal was to complete each service request within 48 hours of the calculator's arrival at the service center. In order to maintain a consumer image for high quality and reliability, Rockwell's goal was to have less than 3% customer returns for warranty repairs.

In three out of five instances, Rockwell's regional sales offices, consumer service centers, and distribution warehouses were located in one facility. The central distribution facility was in El Paso, near the source of most of Rockwell's calculator production. Weekly sales reports plus six month sales estimates by account and by model were sent from computer terminals in regional distribution warehouses to the central computer in El Paso where they were used for inventory control and sales projections. Efficient communication between sales, service, and distribution were essential, management felt, if Rockwell were to support adequately the trade and its consumers.

Another method by which Rockwell supported the trade was through liberal stock adjustment and price change policies. If a retailer found it necessary to adjust his inventory, Rockwell accepted up to five percent of the prior six months purchases without restocking charge provided the products returned were listed on the current price sheet, were new, unused, and in their original cartons, and were authorized by the account's district sales manager. Returns had to be prepaid to a Rockwell customer service center, and an equal dollar value order had to be placed at the same time as the return. In the event Rockwell reduced prices, dealers received a credit for the difference between the old and new price for shipments made in the prior thirty days. Dealers were advised of price changes ten days before they occurred.

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Rockwell management considered training retail salespeople to be an essential part of its program. Rockwell's salespeople were instructed to emphasize the company's in-store retail training programs in all sales presentations. Rockwell's salespeople were also expected to arrange formal group training meetings for retail salespeople whenever possible and to conduct on-going over-the-counter training at each retail outlet.

The primary thrust of Rockwell's initial advertising campaign was a cooperative program under which Rockwell paid an advertising allowance of up to three percent of a retailer's net purchases. Rockwell made available prepared scripts, films, newspaper ads, specification sheets, mailers, and point of purchase displays to retailers who wished to use them. For retailers who preferred to prepare their own advertisements, Rockwell insisted that the name "Rockwell" appear in the headline, that the name be used as many times as the retailer's name, and that one or more Rockwell calculators be identified and described. Rockwell ads appeared in local newspapers, on local radio and television stations, in metro editions of Time, Newsweek, and Sports Illustrated, and on billboards. Moreover, in November and December, Rockwell ran a few national television commercials, and calculators were occasionally mentioned in some major corporate television ads. Industry sources estimated Rockwell's 1974 advertising expenditures to have been about \$1.3 million. (See Exhibit 8 for samples of advertisements Rockwell supplied and Exhibit 9 for advertising expenditures of different calculator manufacturers.)

Since TI was already well established in most of the accounts Rockwell wanted to enter, Rockwell management felt it should offer better retail and wholesale prices than TI offered. For example, the suggested retail price for its lowest priced model, the 10R, 8-digit electronic calculator, was \$29.95, as compared to \$44.95 for TI's lowest priced model, the TI-2500. Moreover, Rockwell offered retailer margins of from 28% to 40%. Industry sources reported that department store margins on calculators usually ranged from 30% to 35% while mass merchandiser margins on calculators were usually from 10% to 18%.

Rockwell delivered its first branded calculators in September 1974, and by the end of 1974, it had sold approximately 500,000 units. It had succeeded in opening most of its primary and secondary target accounts plus many others, and in all it had about 300 accounts which together had 2,500 outlets. In January 1975, it introduced five new models. The 12R, 21R, and 31R, which retailed for \$29.95, \$49.95, and \$59.95 respectively and all of which were rechargeable, then became the lower end of Rockwell's regular line, and the nonrechargeable 10R, 20R, and 30R became promotional items. (See Exhibit 10 for details of Rockwell's new product line.)

Industry and Market Developments, Early 1975

During the early part of 1975, the calculator industry was characterized by continuing price reductions and further manufacturer shakeouts. It was thought that the companies that had the marketing clout, the manufacturing ability, the component capability, and the cash on hand would force marginal companies out of the business, and retailers were becoming increasingly conscious of the need to have a good solid company as their supplier.

The distinction between products for mass merchandisers and products for department stores was increasingly blurred because of the drop in all prices. Many felt that, if general economic conditions were better, department stores might get out of the calculator business entirely. Most felt it was only a matter of time before mass merchandisers took over the vast majority of the calculator business.

The movement toward using distributors also appeared to be increasing, and some people thought that distributors would eventually handle as much as 80% of calculators sold. Moreover, more sophisticated marketing practices were expected to be introduced. "Calculator manufacturing companies have traditionally been run by engineers, and the only marketing tactic they've known is to cut price," one retailer commented.

Though there had been little consumer research done in the industry, that which had been done indicated that the average age of purchasers was decreasing, that male heads of households were the primary users, followed by female heads of households, and that usage by the latter group was increasing. Thirty-eight percent of the purchasers said they paid less for their calculators than they had expected to pay. Twenty-six percent said they bought TI products, and 31% of the people who said they were planning to purchase a calculator in the future said they would buy a TI product. Half saif they knew what brand they wanted before they went into the store, and that they did, in fact, buy that brand.

Survey by Home Furnishings Daily

Early in 1975, Home Furnishings Daily surveyed fifty retailers in twenty-six major markets to determine how the various calculator manufacturers were perceived by the trade. TI was carried by 88% of the retailers surveyed, Litronix by 50%, Rockwell by 48%, Bowmar by 38%, HP by 34%, and Casio by 30%. No other manufacturer was in more than 25% of the accounts.

In terms of brand awareness, TI was clearly the market leader, with 98% of the retailers saying that TI had the most consumer recognition of any of the brands. TI was followed by Bowmar, HP, Rockwell, Litronix, and Casio, in that order, while Canon, Commodore, Corvus, Craig, Lloyds, Novus, Sharp, and Unisonic received very limited mention. TI was especially well known in the moderate priced segment of the market, while HP was more popular in the higher-priced, scientific segment. Bowmar received its highest brand recognition on the East Coast, while Commodore, Novus, and Litronix were better known on the West Coast.

In terms of profitability for retailers, TI ranked first, Bowmar second, and Casio third. However, retailers reported that calculators were so frequently used as promotional items to generate traffic that retailer margins were not very large on any line. Generally speaking, the higher-priced produducts had higher percentage markups, usually around forty percent. Litronix products, followed by Rockwell and TI, were said to represent the best value. TI held the number one ranking for machine cosmetics, followed by HP and Rockwell. HP was said to offer the best training program for retail salespeople. TI ranked second and Rockwell third. Many retailers stated, however, that no manufacturer offered really good training, and they considered this a serious gap in manufacturers' services.

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In overall advertising assistance, TI ranked first, followed by Litronix and Rockwell. HP was said to offer the most attractive and instructional point of purchase aids. It was followed by Rockwell and TI. Retailers said that most manufacturers offered a "rolling" cooperative advertising plan under which they paid up to three percent of sales within a specified time period, usually three months. HP's cooperative advertising allowance was only two percent of sales.

The industry as a whole was given high marks for product reliability, with an average defect rate of only two to three percent. HP's defect rate was said to be less than two percent, and Litronix, Casio, and Rockwell were also rated very high in product reliability. No one emerged as the clear leader in offering price protection. Most offered thirty-day price protection programs, though Lloyds offered a ninety-day plan while Casio had a sixty-day plan. In terms of growth potential, Rockwell ranked highest, followed by HP, Litronix, and Novus.

This survey indicated that TI was the undisputed industry leader. In nearly half of the outlets surveyed, TI had at least a fifty percent market share. However, there was some in dication that TI's dominance might be slipping. Some retailers said TI was losing market share in their outlets, and others said they were anxious to reduce their dependence on TI because of its dictatorial manner. One buyer said there was a lack of communication between TI's field salespeople and its headquarters staff, and that this resulted in the salespeople's inability to supply information to help retailers plan their product lines. Another said he got double shipments around Christmas and that it was very difficult to cancel an order from TI. The company was also criticized for its rapid price-cutting policies and for a price structure which many retailers considered far too high for the products offered. Another source of contention between TI and retailers was that TI had recently opened some retail units in Europe, one in Dallas, and one in San Francisco and was thought to be considering opening such outlets across the country to sell its calculators plus other consumer electronic products which it was expected to introduce soon.

The retailers stated that Bowmar was the only manufacturer to raise retail prices in 1974, and doing this yielded retailer profits as high as forty percent even on lower-priced products. Nevertheless, Bowmar was known to be in a very weak financial position, and this made retailers cautious about reordering the line. They expected Bowmar to trim its line and concentrate more on low-end goods in an attempt to reestablish its position in the market.

While HP was widely praised for its product quality, it was criticized for not allowing for larger retail margins. One retailer said HP gave him only about a twenty-five percent markup. Furthermore, some retailers said they had problems getting orders on time, but they felt this was due to HP's only recently entering the consumer market. In February, HP began a new sales effort to build a broader retail base. Its lowest price machine was the HP-21 which retailed for \$125.

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Rockwell was the only supplier mentioned by at least four percent of the retailers in all fifteen rating categories. Many retailers said Rockwell's pricing had been extremely aggressive, especially since it had introduced its lower-price rechargeable units in January. However, retailers gave mixed reports about how well the products were moving. Some said the products had not moved well in the fall of 1974 because of delivery problems and because advertising support had been late. Other retailers thought Rockwell had tried to get into the market too late in the year, after a lot of retailers had placed their orders for Christmas. Many thought Rockwell would become a more attractive supplier as time went on because retailers were increasingly looking for a solid company to buy from. "Rockwell has the money behind it to survive in this business," one industry source said. "That's what's going to make the difference in the future."

The Decision

As Rockwell executives considered the company's future in the calculator industry, they felt sure that Rockwell could get substantially more volume from its current department store and specialty shop accounts. However, they thought the company could not afford to overlook mass merchandisers if, in fact, that was where the future of the market lay. To get into mass merchandisers, however, Rockwell's advertising and selling costs would increase substantially. For example, in February Rockwell's 1975 budget, assuming it remained with its current outlets, was about \$2 million for advertising and about \$3 million for selling and distribution. If Rockwell decided to pursue mass merchandisers, the executives felt the advertising budget would have to be increased to \$5 million and the selling and distribution costs would probably rise to about \$4 million.

They thought that Rockwell would probably focus on 50 major mass merchandisers, who had a total of 2,000 outlets. Some thought that Rockwell might have trouble getting into a few mass merchandisers because relationships between retailers and suppliers were often stronger in the mass merchandiser market than in the department store market. They pointed out that Unisonic had a secure position as K-Mart's supplier, and that there was no way that Rockwell could get into K-Mart outlets. Most thought, however, that Rockwell would be wise to try to get into mass merchandise channels before TI established a foothold there, and they felt sure that mass merchandisers would prefer working with Rockwell to working with TI.

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Total U.S. Calculator Sales

	Units		Dollars	
1971	500,000		\$100,000,000	
1972	2,500,000		350,000,000	
1973	8,000,000		560,000,000	
1974	12,000,000		680,000,000	
1975	15,000,000	(est.)	630,000,000	(est.)
1976	18,000,000	(est.)	600,000,000	(est.)

Source: Various published sources.

Exhibit 2

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1974 U.S. Unit Sales and Market Share Data, by Manufacturer

	Unit Sales in Millions*	Market Share
Texas Instruments	3.3 - 3.5	29%
National Semiconductor (Novus)	1.1 - 1.3	10
Bowmar	1.1 - 1.3	10
Rockwell	.9 - 1.1	8
Commodore	.9 - 1.1	8
Unisonic	.79	7
Litronix	.57	5
Casio	.57	5
APF	.46	4
Hewlett Packard	.3545	3
Remington	.2535	3
Corvus	.23	2
Unitrex	.1525	2
Other	.5	4
Total	10.85 - 13.05	100%

^{*}Includes both branded and private label sales.

Source: Estimates of industry analysts.

Exhibit 3

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Calculator Lines Produced by Major Manufacturers

	Simple 4-5 Functions	Simple, With Memory	"Slide Rule"
Texas Instruments	x	x	x
National (Novus)	x	x	
Bowmar	x	x	x
Rockwell	x	x	x
Commodore	x	x	x
Unisonic	x	x	x
Litronix	x	x	x
Casio	x	x	x
APF	x	x	x
Hewlett Packard			
Remington	x		
Corvus	x	x	x
Unitrex	x	x	x

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1974 U.S. Sales by Product Category

	Product Category	Unit	Sales	Average Retail Selling Price	Total Retail Sales (in millions)
(1)	Simple 4 or 5 functions	7,000,000	- 8,000,000	\$35	\$245 - 280
(2)	Simple 4 or 5 functions, with memory	1,100,000	- 1,300,000	\$65	\$ 72 - 85
(3)	"Slide Rule" i.e., any unit with a square root or 1/x function	2,400,000	- 2,600,000	\$75	\$180 - 195
(4)	Scientific/Professinal	600,000	- 800,000	\$225	\$135 - 180
		11,100,000	- 12,700,000*		\$632 - 740

*Total differs from unit totals in Exhibit 2 because numbers were derived from different sources. Industry analysts repeatedly emphasized the difficulty of gathering accurate market data.

Source: Estimates of industry analysts.

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1974 U.S. Unit Sales by Distribution Channel

	Estimated Unit Sales % Total Industry S	ales
Department Stores	5,400,000 - 7,200,000 45 - 60%	
Mass Merchandiser	3,000,000 - 4,200,000 25 - 35%	
Others (Drug, book, specialty,	1,800,000 - 2,400,000 15 - 20%	
appliance, and office equipment stores; catalog houses; mail order)	10,200,000 - 13,800,000	

Source: Estimates of Industry Analysts.

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Rockwell's Introductory Target Markets

New York 3 key retailers with to	otal of 39 stores	Atlanta 2 key retailers with total of 19 stores
Los Angeles 3 key retailers with t	otal of 68 stores	Indianapolis 2 key retailers with total of 17 stores
Chicago 3 key retailers with t	otal of 66 stores	Baltimore 3 key retailers with total of 20 stores
Philadelphia 3 key retailers with t	otal of 31 stores	Tampa/St. Petersburgh 1 key retailer with 12 stores
Boston 2 key retailers with t	otal of 18 stores	Secondary Introductory Markets & Dealers
San Francisco/Oakland 4 key retailers with t	otal of 44 stores	New Orleans 2 key retailers with total of 13 stores
Detroit		Tulsa 1 key retailer with 8 stores
Cleveland		Phoenix 1 key retailer with 5 stores
Washington		Portland 1 key retailer with 6 stores
77 Sea est suttain 100	otal of 30 stores	Richmond l key retailer with 16 stores
3 key retailers with t	otal of 22 stores	Sacramento
4 key retailers with t	otal of 24 stores	POST
St. Louis 1 key retailer with 9	stores	MOTOR AND CONTROL OF
Minneapolis/St. Paul 2 key retailers with t	otal of 13 stores	2 key retailers with a total of 12 stores
Houston 3 key retailers with t	otal of 19 stores	San Diego 1 key retailer with 10 stores
Miami 2 key retailers with t	otal of 20 stores	Akron 1 key retailer with 9 stores
Seattle/Tacoma		Denver 2 key retailers with total of 15 stores
3 key retailers with to Cleveland 3 key retailers with to Washington 3 key retailers with to Pittsburgh 3 key retailers with to Dallas/Ft. Worth 4 key retailers with to St. Louis 1 key retailer with 9 Minneapolis/St. Paul 2 key retailers with to Houston 3 key retailers with to Miami 2 key retailers with to Miami 2 key retailers with to Miami 2 key retailers with to Miami	otal of 24 stores otal of 30 stores otal of 22 stores otal of 24 stores stores otal of 13 stores otal of 19 stores otal of 20 stores	Phoenix 1 key retailer with 5 stores Portland 1 key retailer with 6 stores Richmond 1 key retailer with 16 stores Sacramento 1 key retailer with 6 stores Salt Lake City 2 key retailers with 8 stores San Antonio 2 key retailers with a total of 12 stores San Diego 1 key retailer with 10 stores Akron 1 key retailer with 9 stores Denver

Birmingham

1 key retailer with 7 stores

Cincinnati

1 key retailer with 8 stores

Columbus

1 key retailer with 9 stores

Charlotte

1 key retailer with 6 stores

Hartford

1 key retailer with 4 stores

Jacksonville

1 key retailer with 3 stores

Honolulu

1 key retailer with 8 stores

Milwaukee

2 key retailers with a total of 16 stores

Boise

1 key retailer with 19 stores

Source: Company records.



Exhibit 7 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL Microelectronic Product Division Rockwell's Initial Product Line

CALCULATOR PRICE LIST

EFFECTIVE: JULY 15, 1974 ISSUED: JULY 15, 1974

MOI	DEL & DESCRIPTION	*MFR SUGGESTED RETAIL	STANDARD SHIPPING QUANTITY	APPROX WEIGHT	96 TO 462	498 30 80	996 TO 1998	.2004 & UP
10R, 8-digit El	ectronic Calculator	1		-				
10000 10000 10000	Basic Answer features: 8 digits • 4 functions • Algebraic logic • Floating decimal • Repeat function • Battery operated, and included AC jack	\$29.95	12	12	21.75	21.75	21.75	21.75
20R, Electronic	c Calculator with Memory and Percent		18					
00000000000000000000000000000000000000	All Basic Answer features PLUS Full accumulating memory Automatic constants • % key Automatic mark-on and discount Battery operated, and included •AC jack	\$49.95	12	12	35.00	34.50	34.00	33.50
30R, Slide Rule	e Memory Electronic Calculator All Basic Answer features PLUS Full accumulating memory Automatic constants ● % key Automatic mark on and discount Sign change ● Register exchange Reciprocals ● Square ● Square roots Battery operated, and included	\$59.95	12	12	42.00	41.50	40.75	40.00
51R, Universal	Converter Electronic Calculator All Basic Answer features PLUS full accumulating memories Two-place or floating decimal Automatic constants	\$109.95	6	12	71.50	70,75	70.00	69.25
61R, Advance	All Basic Answer features PLUS Full accumulating memory Automatic constants Register exchange Sign change Reciprocals Sum of the squares Square roots Log functions Trig function in degrees of radians Extra-large display Powers Rechargeable batteries plus AC charger and case	\$119.95	6.	12	78.00	77.25	76.50	75.50
80R, 10-digit 8	Printer Electronic Calculator 4 functions Commercial logic 10 digits plus 2 columns of symbols Thermal printer • Floating decimel with override • Automatic constant and repeat • Subtotals, group totals and grand totals • Operates on AC	\$169.95	2	12	107.00	105.50	103.75	102.00

^{*}Manufactures suggested retail price.

· Easily obtainable additional tapes


. U. L. Listed

For shipment of less than 96 units, but 12 or more units to a location in standard shipping quantity, add 2% for each location.

Exhibit 8 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL

Microelectronic Product Division

Rockwell Advertisements



A specific Answer.

Want to advertise a certain model? We'll help you do it with illustrations and copy for each individual calculator in the line.

Because life is full of little problems... we have all The Answers.



STORE NAME HERE


All The Answers at once.

We'll help you advertise the whole line together, too. Use both our copy and our artwork—or just the artwork with your own copy.




TV and you? Here's The Answer.

We've prepared a series of 20-second TV commercials with a 10-second close reserved especially for you—so you can tell your customers that you have The Answers.



The Answer in October magazine advertising.

This is our 3-page announcement ad—the opening gun in our arresting campaign in Metro editions of *Time*; *Newsweek* and *Sports Illustrated*. Our aim: to create customers who'll be Answerable to our brand—and ours alone. The body of this advertisement will remind readers who we are, tell them what we have and build awareness and preference. What's more, they'll leave the ad knowing exactly where to go to get an Answer... because your name goes right on the bottom of the page.



The Answer again and again.

In November and December, we'll follow our introductory advertisement—in the same magazines—with these two attention-getters: A full-color spread, plus a color page reminding people that The Answers make great Christmas gifts. Each advertisement will contain another round of informative, persuasive copy. And each will again show the dealer name at the bottom of the page . . . a profitable place for your store name to be.



The Answer on TV.

We've scheduled a series of delightful, people-oriented commercials to run from the latter part of November to mid-December. Air time? During periods when large numbers of men and women will learn about our product. The content? Examples of ways people can use and benefit from our product. The goal? To get more people to look for The Answers.



The Answer in a leaflet.

This leaflet contains a picture of The Answer calculators, plus a list of the main features of each. Put it on your counter. Enclose it in your customer mailings. Let it remind. Inform. Tempt. Let it raise questions . . . to which you have The Answers.

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL

Microelectronic Product Division

1974 Advertising Expenditures on Calculators by Manufacturers

Texas Instruments	\$4,575,800
National Semiconductor (Novus)	672,200
Bowmar	1,202,400
Rockwell	1,310,200
Commodore	2,300
Litronix	174,200
Casio	510,800
Newlett Packard	297,700
Total	\$8,745,600

Source: Leading National Advertisers, Inc., Multi-Media Survey,
January - December 1974, pp. 70-73. This survey included
magazines, newspaper supplements, network television, spot
television, network radio, and outdoor advertising.

Rockwell International

Business Equipment Division 950 De Guigne Supposele, California 94086

Exhibit 10

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL

CALCULATOR PRICE LIST Page 1 of 2

EFFECTIVE DATE: 15 JAN 1875

Sunny (408)	vale, California 94086 735-7000	fornia 94086 ISSUE DATE: 15 JAN 1975		
MODEL NUM	BER AND DESCRIPTION	STO SHIP QTY	#	a ur
OMOTIONAL ROCKWI	ELL LINE c Calculator			
	Basic Answer feetures:	12	18.00	18.00
	88 digits •4 functions • Algebraic logic Floating decimal • Repeat function • Battery operated, and included • AC jack • Weight: 9 oz. Affr Suggested Retail: \$24.88			
20R, Electronic Calcu	lator with Memory and Percent			
	Ill Basic Answer features PLUS: Full accumulating memory * Automatic onstants *% key * Automatic mark-on nd discount * Battery operated, and ncluded * AC jack Weight: 10 oz. Iffr Suggested Retail: \$39.88	12	28.75	28.75
30R, Slide Rule Mem	ory Electronic Calculator			
	All Basic Answer features PLUS: Full accumulating memory *Automatic constants *% key *Automatic mark-on and discount *Sign change *Register exchange *Reciprocals *Square *Square roots *Battery operated, and included *Weight: 10 oz. Wiff Suggested Retail: \$49.88	12	35.75	35.75
HE ANSWER-ROCKWI	ELL LINE			
12R, 8-digit, Electro	nic Calculator with Square Root			
	Sasic 8 features: 8 digits •4 functions + square root Algebraic logic • Floating decimal Repeat function • Battery operated, and included •AC jack •AC dapter included •Weight: 9 oz. Iff Suggested Retail: \$29.95	12	21.75	21.75
21R, Rechargeable E and Percent	lectronic Calculator with Memory			
M	All Basic Answer features PLUS: Full, addressable memory, Automatic constants Key Automatic mark on and discount Rechargeable batteries AC charger jack AC charger/adapter case Weight: 10 oz. Iffr Suggested Retail: \$49.95	12	36.50	35.00
31R, Rechargeable St Calculator	lide Rule Memory Electronic	1		
	All Basic Answer features PLUS: Full addressable memory Automatic constants & key Automatic mark-on and discount Sign change Register exchange Reciprocals Square Square roots Rechargeable batteries AC charger jack AC charger/adapter & case Weight: 10 oz. Mfr Seggested Retail: \$59.95	12	42.50	42.00
61R, Advanced Slide	Rule Electronic Calculator	1	27.93	93555
	All Basic Answer features PLUS: Full accumulating memory Automatic constants Register exchange Sign change Reciprocal Sum of the squares Square roots Log functions Trig function in degrees of radians Extra-large display Powers Rechargeable batteries		54.00	53.50
	plus AC charger/adapter, and case • Weight: 1 lb 10 oz. Mfr Suggested Retail: \$79.95	Shipments to one or more additional cartons will be made for a 2% handli	l locations of 12 or more unit ng charge.	s in standard skipping



Rockwell International

Business Equipment Division 950 De Guigne Sunnyvale, California 94086 (408) 735-7000

Exhibit 10 (continued)

CALCULATOR PRICE LIST Page 2 of 2

EFFECTIVE DATE: 15 JAN 1975

ISSUE DATE: 5 JAN 1975

MODEL NUMBER AND DESCRIPTION	STO SHIP QTY	48- 95	96- A UP
All Basic Answer features PLUS: Full addressable memory, Scientific notation Two level parenthesis Automatic constants Register exchessign change Reciprocal Square rolling functions Degree/radian conversion Factorial Extra-large display Pow Rechargeable batteries plus AC adapte and case Weight: 1 lb 10 oz. Mfr Suggested Retail: \$99.95	inge ots rees	66.50	65.00
51R, Universal Converter Electronic Calculator All Basic Answer features PLUS: Full accumulating memories *Two-por floating decimal *Automatic construence of the fraction calculations *224 fixed conversions plus programmable conversions plus programmable conversions plus programmable conversions plus programmable conversions plus AC charger and case Weight: 1 lb 10 oz. Mfr Suggested Retail: \$99.95	ents	65.50	65.00
All Basic Answer features PLUS: 4 functions • Commercial logic 10 digits plus 2 columns of symbols Thermal printer • Floating decimal override • Automatic constant and re Subtotals, group totals and grand to: Operates on AC • Easily obtainable additional tapes • U.L. listed Dust cover • Weight: 6 lbs Mfr Suggested Retail: \$139.95	with peat tals	90.00	88.25
All Basic Answer features PLUS: • 4 functions • Commercial logic • 12 digits plus 2 columns of symbols • Thermal printer • Floating fixed monetary decimal selection • Automs constant and repeat • Subtotals, groutotals and grand totals • Operates on • Percent, 4-key memory, • Non-add & • Easily obtainable additional tapes • cover • U.L. listed • Weight: 6 lbs Mfr Suggested Retail: \$169.95	etic p AC .ey	109.00	107.00

ACCESSORIES	STD QTY	DEALER COST		STD QTY	DEALER
01R AND 02R ACCESSORY KITS 01R - Brown Vinyl Case, AC Adapter, for Models 10R, 20R, and 30R; Input 120V-60 Hz; Output 7.9 VDC.	6	\$3.60	107R AND 108R AC ADAPTER/CHARGER 107R AC Adapter/Charger 120/60 for 51R, 61R, 63R, 21R, 31R Mfr Suggested Retail: \$4.95	6	3.00
50 Ma Mfr Suggested Retail: \$5.95 02R — Brown Vinyl Case, AC Adapter,	6	\$5.40	106R AC Adapter/Charger Switchable 120/220 for international use	6	4.20
for Models 10R, 20R, and 30R; Input Switchable between 120V-60Hz and 220V-50 Hz; Output7.9 VDC, 50 Ma Mfr Suggested Retail: \$8.95			Mfr Suggested Retail: \$6.95 205R CARRYING CASE Carry case for 10R, 20R, 30R,	12	1.20
105R AND 106R AC Adapter 105R AC Adapter 120V-60 Hz for 10R, 20R, 30R,	6	3.00	12R, 21R, 31R Mfr Suggested Retail: \$2.00 207R CARRYING CASE		
12R Mfr Suggested Retail: \$4.95	100	200	Carry case for 51R, 61R, 62R	12	1.80
106R AC Adapter Switchable 120V-60 Hz for international use Mfr Suggested Retail: \$6.95	6	4.20	Mfr Suggested Retail: \$3.00 TT270 TAPES Three Tapes for Models 80R/82R 2%" x 164' Each	3	\$1.95

Shipments to one or more additional locations of 12 or more units in standard shipping cartons will be made for a 2% handling charge.